Let me elaborate.<\/p>\n
Is it a secret?<\/em><\/h4>\nA simple question or so it would seem.<\/p>\n
On March 9, 1979, a temporary restraining order stopped the Progressive from publishing an article by Howard Morland containing the \u201csecrets\u201d of the hydrogen bomb.[1]<\/a> But were there any secrets? No classified information was used to prepare the article. Indeed, the most important reference was an article in the Encyclopedia Americana written by Dr. Edward Teller ten years earlier. While the lawyers were exchanging briefs in the case, highly technical H-bomb reports, UCRL-4725 and UCRL-5280 sat on the open shelves at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory\u2019s public library. These reports were at least as revealing as the Morland article. They were later reclassified. The Justice Department\u2019s case unraveled as it became more and more obvious that the \u201csecret\u201d was already out.<\/p>\nTo be credible, a yes answer requires more than, \u201cWell, I didn\u2019t tell anybody.\u201d In today\u2019s world there are many sources of information. If any person with the desire, using only unclassified sources, can uncover the information then it is not secret. It follows then, that any compilation or reorganization of unclassified information cannot meet this standard.<\/p>\n
Who must not find out?<\/em><\/h4>\nDuring warfare this question has an obvious answer. An enemy acquiring information about troop movements or invasion plans or the like can create serious damage. Before any information can be classified the who must be as clearly definable.<\/p>\n
The August 11, 1984 issue of Jane\u2019s Defense Weekly included photographs of the first Soviet nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, then being built on the Black Sea. That started a chain of events that put Samuel Morison in prison.[2]<\/a><\/p>\nThe Soviets knew they were building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Soviets also knew we had the means to photograph the carrier. The photographs were taken by a KH-11 spy satellite. In 1978, the Soviets obtained a copy of the system\u2019s manuals. In 1980, the Iranians published a number of photographs they recovered from the aborted U.S. mission to rescue the hostages. In 1981, Aviation Week printed a photograph of a Russian airstrip taken with a KH-11. The capabilities of the spy satellite were no secret.<\/p>\n
In this case, who must not find out? I still can\u2019t figure out that one.<\/p>\n
In answering this question, the primary target of secrecy must never be the American public. During our involvement in Vietnam, the administration tried to keep the bombing in Cambodia a secret. Frankly, bombing is a difficult thing to keep secret. The Cambodians knew they were being bombed, so did the Vietnamese and through them even the Soviets knew what was happening. The real target of secrecy was the American public.<\/p>\n
What harm will come to the United States if \u201cthey\u201d find out?<\/em><\/h4>\nThe basic premise is that information must be classified to protect national security. National security is a vague term, one easily abused.<\/p>\n
There was a substantial controversy surrounding the 1977 publication of Decent Interval by Frank Snepp. The real issue was less about protecting the national security than about protecting individuals and agencies from public ridicule.<\/p>\n
All too often, classification is used not to protect the national security but to protect individuals, agencies, or the current administration from accusations of corruption, mismanagement, etc. Those individuals authorized to classify information must understand that their individual self-interest is not national security; the embarrassment of a government agency is not national security; the continued funding of a government program is not national security.<\/p>\n
In 1982, Ronald Regan\u2019s Executive Order 12356 removed the Carter restriction that information could only be classified if its disclosure could cause \u201cidentifiable\u201d damage to national security. It is time to return to that standard.<\/p>\n
Why should we be concerned about government secrecy?<\/em><\/h4>\nIn 1991, the federal government classified 7,107,017 documents. In 1989, the cost to industry of protecting classified information reached $13.8 billion according to Department of Defense estimates.[3]<\/a><\/p>\nThe cost of secrecy goes beyond that. In 1991 there were 5,893 secrecy orders in effect including 506 \u201cJohn Doe\u201d orders.[4]<\/a> The American public did not gain any benefit from these new technologies. The secrecy orders represent opportunities lost.<\/p>\nIn 1970, the Defense Science Board\u2019s Task Force on Security investigated the effectiveness of the nation\u2019s security system.[5]<\/a> The committee, containing such luminaries as Dr. Edward Teller, wrote:<\/p>\n\u201cIn spite of elaborate and very costly measures taken independently by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to preserve technical secrecy, neither the United Kingdom nor China was long delayed in developing hydrogen weapons.<\/p>\n
\u201cAlso, classification of technical information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration. There are many cases in which the declassification of technical information within our system probably had a beneficial effect and its classification has had a deleterious one.\u201d<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"http:\/\/borjeson.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/01\/typewriter2.jpg\" "\\"typewriter2\\"")
<\/a><\/p>\n[1]<\/a> Howard Morland, \u201cThe H-bomb secret \u2013 To know how is to ask why,\u201d The Progressive<\/a>(Nov. 1979)<\/em><\/p>\n[2]<\/a> Philip Weiss, \u201cThe Quiet Coup,\u201d Harper\u2019s Magazine (Sept. 1989)<\/em><\/p>\n[3]<\/a> Steven Aftergood, \u201cThe Perils of Government Secrecy,\u201d Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1992)<\/em><\/p>\n[4]<\/a> When applying for a patent, an inventor can instead be hit with a secrecy order. The invention must be kept secret. Typically secrecy orders are applied to technology developed with the assistance of government funding. A \u201cJohn Doe\u201d secrecy order applies to technology developed independent of government financing.<\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Frederick Seitz, chairman, \u201cReport of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy.\u201d Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, July 1, 1970.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"May 13\/1995 Over seven million documents are classified every year. It is time to revise our system. I suggest that before any information is classified, credible answers to the following questions must be provided. Is it a secret? Who must … Continue reading
To be credible, a yes answer requires more than, \u201cWell, I didn\u2019t tell anybody.\u201d In today\u2019s world there are many sources of information. If any person with the desire, using only unclassified sources, can uncover the information then it is not secret. It follows then, that any compilation or reorganization of unclassified information cannot meet this standard.<\/p>\n
Who must not find out?<\/em><\/h4>\nDuring warfare this question has an obvious answer. An enemy acquiring information about troop movements or invasion plans or the like can create serious damage. Before any information can be classified the who must be as clearly definable.<\/p>\n
The August 11, 1984 issue of Jane\u2019s Defense Weekly included photographs of the first Soviet nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, then being built on the Black Sea. That started a chain of events that put Samuel Morison in prison.[2]<\/a><\/p>\nThe Soviets knew they were building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Soviets also knew we had the means to photograph the carrier. The photographs were taken by a KH-11 spy satellite. In 1978, the Soviets obtained a copy of the system\u2019s manuals. In 1980, the Iranians published a number of photographs they recovered from the aborted U.S. mission to rescue the hostages. In 1981, Aviation Week printed a photograph of a Russian airstrip taken with a KH-11. The capabilities of the spy satellite were no secret.<\/p>\n
In this case, who must not find out? I still can\u2019t figure out that one.<\/p>\n
In answering this question, the primary target of secrecy must never be the American public. During our involvement in Vietnam, the administration tried to keep the bombing in Cambodia a secret. Frankly, bombing is a difficult thing to keep secret. The Cambodians knew they were being bombed, so did the Vietnamese and through them even the Soviets knew what was happening. The real target of secrecy was the American public.<\/p>\n
What harm will come to the United States if \u201cthey\u201d find out?<\/em><\/h4>\nThe basic premise is that information must be classified to protect national security. National security is a vague term, one easily abused.<\/p>\n
There was a substantial controversy surrounding the 1977 publication of Decent Interval by Frank Snepp. The real issue was less about protecting the national security than about protecting individuals and agencies from public ridicule.<\/p>\n
All too often, classification is used not to protect the national security but to protect individuals, agencies, or the current administration from accusations of corruption, mismanagement, etc. Those individuals authorized to classify information must understand that their individual self-interest is not national security; the embarrassment of a government agency is not national security; the continued funding of a government program is not national security.<\/p>\n
In 1982, Ronald Regan\u2019s Executive Order 12356 removed the Carter restriction that information could only be classified if its disclosure could cause \u201cidentifiable\u201d damage to national security. It is time to return to that standard.<\/p>\n
Why should we be concerned about government secrecy?<\/em><\/h4>\nIn 1991, the federal government classified 7,107,017 documents. In 1989, the cost to industry of protecting classified information reached $13.8 billion according to Department of Defense estimates.[3]<\/a><\/p>\nThe cost of secrecy goes beyond that. In 1991 there were 5,893 secrecy orders in effect including 506 \u201cJohn Doe\u201d orders.[4]<\/a> The American public did not gain any benefit from these new technologies. The secrecy orders represent opportunities lost.<\/p>\nIn 1970, the Defense Science Board\u2019s Task Force on Security investigated the effectiveness of the nation\u2019s security system.[5]<\/a> The committee, containing such luminaries as Dr. Edward Teller, wrote:<\/p>\n\u201cIn spite of elaborate and very costly measures taken independently by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to preserve technical secrecy, neither the United Kingdom nor China was long delayed in developing hydrogen weapons.<\/p>\n
\u201cAlso, classification of technical information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration. There are many cases in which the declassification of technical information within our system probably had a beneficial effect and its classification has had a deleterious one.\u201d<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/p>\n[1]<\/a> Howard Morland, \u201cThe H-bomb secret \u2013 To know how is to ask why,\u201d The Progressive<\/a>(Nov. 1979)<\/em><\/p>\n[2]<\/a> Philip Weiss, \u201cThe Quiet Coup,\u201d Harper\u2019s Magazine (Sept. 1989)<\/em><\/p>\n[3]<\/a> Steven Aftergood, \u201cThe Perils of Government Secrecy,\u201d Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1992)<\/em><\/p>\n[4]<\/a> When applying for a patent, an inventor can instead be hit with a secrecy order. The invention must be kept secret. Typically secrecy orders are applied to technology developed with the assistance of government funding. A \u201cJohn Doe\u201d secrecy order applies to technology developed independent of government financing.<\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Frederick Seitz, chairman, \u201cReport of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy.\u201d Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, July 1, 1970.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"May 13\/1995 Over seven million documents are classified every year. It is time to revise our system. I suggest that before any information is classified, credible answers to the following questions must be provided. Is it a secret? Who must … Continue reading
The Soviets knew they were building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Soviets also knew we had the means to photograph the carrier. The photographs were taken by a KH-11 spy satellite. In 1978, the Soviets obtained a copy of the system\u2019s manuals. In 1980, the Iranians published a number of photographs they recovered from the aborted U.S. mission to rescue the hostages. In 1981, Aviation Week printed a photograph of a Russian airstrip taken with a KH-11. The capabilities of the spy satellite were no secret.<\/p>\n
In this case, who must not find out? I still can\u2019t figure out that one.<\/p>\n
In answering this question, the primary target of secrecy must never be the American public. During our involvement in Vietnam, the administration tried to keep the bombing in Cambodia a secret. Frankly, bombing is a difficult thing to keep secret. The Cambodians knew they were being bombed, so did the Vietnamese and through them even the Soviets knew what was happening. The real target of secrecy was the American public.<\/p>\n
What harm will come to the United States if \u201cthey\u201d find out?<\/em><\/h4>\nThe basic premise is that information must be classified to protect national security. National security is a vague term, one easily abused.<\/p>\n
There was a substantial controversy surrounding the 1977 publication of Decent Interval by Frank Snepp. The real issue was less about protecting the national security than about protecting individuals and agencies from public ridicule.<\/p>\n
All too often, classification is used not to protect the national security but to protect individuals, agencies, or the current administration from accusations of corruption, mismanagement, etc. Those individuals authorized to classify information must understand that their individual self-interest is not national security; the embarrassment of a government agency is not national security; the continued funding of a government program is not national security.<\/p>\n
In 1982, Ronald Regan\u2019s Executive Order 12356 removed the Carter restriction that information could only be classified if its disclosure could cause \u201cidentifiable\u201d damage to national security. It is time to return to that standard.<\/p>\n
Why should we be concerned about government secrecy?<\/em><\/h4>\nIn 1991, the federal government classified 7,107,017 documents. In 1989, the cost to industry of protecting classified information reached $13.8 billion according to Department of Defense estimates.[3]<\/a><\/p>\nThe cost of secrecy goes beyond that. In 1991 there were 5,893 secrecy orders in effect including 506 \u201cJohn Doe\u201d orders.[4]<\/a> The American public did not gain any benefit from these new technologies. The secrecy orders represent opportunities lost.<\/p>\nIn 1970, the Defense Science Board\u2019s Task Force on Security investigated the effectiveness of the nation\u2019s security system.[5]<\/a> The committee, containing such luminaries as Dr. Edward Teller, wrote:<\/p>\n\u201cIn spite of elaborate and very costly measures taken independently by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to preserve technical secrecy, neither the United Kingdom nor China was long delayed in developing hydrogen weapons.<\/p>\n
\u201cAlso, classification of technical information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration. There are many cases in which the declassification of technical information within our system probably had a beneficial effect and its classification has had a deleterious one.\u201d<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/p>\n[1]<\/a> Howard Morland, \u201cThe H-bomb secret \u2013 To know how is to ask why,\u201d The Progressive<\/a>(Nov. 1979)<\/em><\/p>\n[2]<\/a> Philip Weiss, \u201cThe Quiet Coup,\u201d Harper\u2019s Magazine (Sept. 1989)<\/em><\/p>\n[3]<\/a> Steven Aftergood, \u201cThe Perils of Government Secrecy,\u201d Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1992)<\/em><\/p>\n[4]<\/a> When applying for a patent, an inventor can instead be hit with a secrecy order. The invention must be kept secret. Typically secrecy orders are applied to technology developed with the assistance of government funding. A \u201cJohn Doe\u201d secrecy order applies to technology developed independent of government financing.<\/p>\n[5]<\/a> Frederick Seitz, chairman, \u201cReport of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy.\u201d Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, July 1, 1970.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"May 13\/1995 Over seven million documents are classified every year. It is time to revise our system. I suggest that before any information is classified, credible answers to the following questions must be provided. Is it a secret? Who must … Continue reading
In 1991, the federal government classified 7,107,017 documents. In 1989, the cost to industry of protecting classified information reached $13.8 billion according to Department of Defense estimates.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n The cost of secrecy goes beyond that. In 1991 there were 5,893 secrecy orders in effect including 506 \u201cJohn Doe\u201d orders.[4]<\/a> The American public did not gain any benefit from these new technologies. The secrecy orders represent opportunities lost.<\/p>\n In 1970, the Defense Science Board\u2019s Task Force on Security investigated the effectiveness of the nation\u2019s security system.[5]<\/a> The committee, containing such luminaries as Dr. Edward Teller, wrote:<\/p>\n \u201cIn spite of elaborate and very costly measures taken independently by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to preserve technical secrecy, neither the United Kingdom nor China was long delayed in developing hydrogen weapons.<\/p>\n \u201cAlso, classification of technical information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration. There are many cases in which the declassification of technical information within our system probably had a beneficial effect and its classification has had a deleterious one.\u201d<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Howard Morland, \u201cThe H-bomb secret \u2013 To know how is to ask why,\u201d The Progressive<\/a>(Nov. 1979)<\/em><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Philip Weiss, \u201cThe Quiet Coup,\u201d Harper\u2019s Magazine (Sept. 1989)<\/em><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Steven Aftergood, \u201cThe Perils of Government Secrecy,\u201d Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1992)<\/em><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> When applying for a patent, an inventor can instead be hit with a secrecy order. The invention must be kept secret. Typically secrecy orders are applied to technology developed with the assistance of government funding. A \u201cJohn Doe\u201d secrecy order applies to technology developed independent of government financing.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Frederick Seitz, chairman, \u201cReport of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy.\u201d Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, July 1, 1970.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" May 13\/1995 Over seven million documents are classified every year. It is time to revise our system. I suggest that before any information is classified, credible answers to the following questions must be provided. Is it a secret? Who must … Continue reading <\/a><\/p>\n